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Abstract—Distributed collaborative learning (DCL) paradigms
enable building joint machine learning models from distrusting
multi-party participants. Data confidentiality is guaranteed by
retaining private training data on each participant’s local infras-
tructure. However, this approach to achieving data confidentiality
makes today’s DCL designs fundamentally vulnerable to data
poisoning and backdoor attacks. It also limits DCL’s model
accountability, which is key to backtracking the responsible
“bad” training data instances/contributors. In this paper, we
introduce CALTRAIN1, a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)
based centralized multi-party collaborative learning system that
simultaneously achieves data confidentiality and model account-
ability. CALTRAIN enforces isolated computation on centrally
aggregated training data to guarantee data confidentiality. To
support building accountable learning models, we securely main-
tain the links between training instances and their corresponding
contributors. Our evaluation shows that the models generated
from CALTRAIN can achieve the same prediction accuracy when
compared to the models trained in non-protected environments.
We also demonstrate that when malicious training participants
tend to implant backdoors during model training, CALTRAIN can
accurately and precisely discover the poisoned and mislabeled
training data that lead to the runtime mispredictions.
I. INTRODUCTION
The abundance and diversity of training data are important
for building successful machine learning (ML) models. But,
high-quality training data are scarce. Collaborative learning,
in which multiple parties contribute their private data to
jointly train an ML model, aims to address the shortage of
high-quality training resources. However, in many mission-
critical and privacy-sensitive domains, such as health care,
finance, and education, training data are tightly controlled by
their owners. Sharing raw data is not permitted by law or
regulations.
To meet the security and privacy requirements, multiple
distributed collaborative learning paradigms [1], [2] have
been proposed to ensure that sensitive training data never
leave the participants’ compute infrastructures. Shokri and
Shmatikov [1] proposed a distributed collaborative training
system that exploited the parallelism property of stochastic
gradient descent (SGD). Training participants can locally
and independently build a model with their private datasets,
then selectively share subsets of the model’s parameters. In
Federated Learning [2], a central server can coordinate an
iterative model averaging process. At each training round, a
subset of randomly selected training participants compute the
1CALTRAIN stands for Confidential and Accountable Training System
differences to the global model with their local private training
set and communicate the updates to the central server.
The benefits of client-controlled autonomous data protection
come at a price. These approaches are vulnerable to data
poisoning attacks, which can be instantiated by malicious
or compromised training participants. The reason for this
inherent vulnerability stems from how security is enforced
in most distributed learning mechanisms. There, training data
are kept invisible to all participants, except for the data owner.
Consequently, malicious data contributors can exploit this non-
transparency to feed poisoned/mislabeled training data and
implant backdoors into the corresponding models [3]–[8].
Thus, they can influence and drift the final models’ predictions
for their own benefits.
All of the above highlight an important paradox: data
confidentiality is in conflict with model accountability in dis-
tributed collaborative learning. Especially with amortized and
stochastic model updates, links between training data, training
participants, and models have been completely dismantled.
Once model users encounter erroneous predictions at runtime,
they can no longer backtrack the responsible “bad” training
data and their provenance.
Separately, there is an emerging trend towards leveraging
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), or isolated enclaves,
to secure machine learning training pipelines. For example,
Ohrimenko et al. [9] proposed using Intel Software Guard
Extensions (SGX) to enable multi-party training for different
machine learning methods. More recently, Chiron [10] and
Myelin [11] integrated SGX to support private deep learning
training services. In general, current TEE-based training ap-
proaches encounter two performance limiters: (1) TEEs lack
hardware acceleration, and (2) TEEs are memory constrained.
As a consequence, it is challenging to execute deep and
complex learning models entirely within an isolated execution
environment.
To address the aforementioned problems, we design and
implement CALTRAIN, a TEE-based centralized collaborative
learning system, to simultaneously achieve both data confiden-
tiality and model accountability. CALTRAIN uses Intel SGX
enclaves on training machines to ensure the confidentiality
and integrity of training data. To overcome the performance
constraints of current SGX, we design a partitioned train-
ing mechanism to support learning large-scale deep neural
networks with more complex structures. To achieve model
accountability, we propose (a) one-way fingerprinting for all
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training instances and (b) maintaining the links between fin-
gerprints and training participants. We ensure that the recorded
fingerprints cannot be reconstructed to reveal the original
training data, but can still facilitate debugging incorrect pre-
dictions and identifying the influential training data and their
corresponding contributors.
In our evaluation, we demonstrate that models trained
within CALTRAIN can effectively protect the confidentiality of
private training data and incur no loss on prediction accuracy
compared to models trained in regular training environments.
To verify the effectiveness of model accountability, we test
CALTRAIN with the Trojaning Attack [4], whose authors gen-
erously released both their poisoned training datasets and pre-
trained models with embedded backdoors to us for reproducing
the attack. Our experiment shows that we can precisely and
accurately identify the poisoned and mislabeled training data,
and further discover the malicious training participants.
To summarize, the major contributions are as follows:
• Confidential Learning: a TEE-based collaborative learn-
ing system to protect training data confidentiality,
• Partitioned Training: a learning workload partitioning
mechanism to address the performance and capacity
constraints of existing TEE technologies, and
• Model Accountability: a data fingerprinting mechanism
on training instances to support post-hoc provenance and
causality tracking for mispredictions.
Roadmap. Section II introduces the relevant background
knowledge. Section III talks about the threat model of our
proposed system. Section IV details the design principles of
CALTRAIN. Section V describes the implementation of our
research prototype. Section VI presents the model accuracy,
performance, and accountability experiments as our evaluation.
Section VII discusses the application scenarios and security
implications of potential attacks. Section VIII surveys related
work, and we conclude in Section IX.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we give a brief summary about deep learning,
collaborative training, and Intel SGX.
Deep Learning. Deep learning approaches enable end-to-end
learning by automatically discovering data representations of
raw inputs. At the core of any deep learning system is a
deep neural network (DNN). A DNN has multiple hidden
layers between the input and output layers. Each layer contains
multiple neurons. Each cross-layer connection between two
neurons has an associated weight. The weights are learned in
the training stage by maximizing objective functions. Mini-
batch SGD with backpropagation is by far the most widely
used mechanism for learning the weights.
Collaborative Training. Deep learning training demands mas-
sive high-quality training data, which may not be possessed
by individuals or small organizations. The concept of col-
laborative learning was proposed to crowd-source training
data from multiple parties, e.g., training participants A-D in
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Fig. 1: The System Architecture of CALTRAIN
Figure 1. The learning models are built and refined jointly
upon the training data provisioned from their participants. As
an incentive for contributing training data, the final learned
models are released to all participants. Collaborative training
is an attractive paradigm to break data monopoly, but it
also raises new challenges around data confidentiality, model
accountability, privacy protection, fairness of incentives, etc.
Intel SGX. Intel SGX [12] offers a non-hierarchical protection
model to support secure computation on untrusted remote
servers. SGX includes a set of new instructions and memory
protection mechanisms. A user-level application can instantiate
a hardware-protected container, called an enclave. An enclave
resides in the application’s address space and guarantees
confidentiality and integrity of the code and data within it.
SGX sets aside a memory region, referred to as the Processor
Reserved Memory (PRM), within which Enclave Page Cache
(EPC) stores the code and data of an enclave. SGX enforces
memory encryption and access control to prevent illegitimate
out-of-enclave memory accesses. Privileged software, such
as hypervisor, Basic Input/Output System (BIOS), System
Management Mode (SMM), and operating system (OS), is not
allowed to access and tamper the code/data of an initialized
enclave. Remote attestation is crucial to demonstrate the
integrity of SGX platforms and the code/data loaded into
enclaves. Secrets should only be provisioned into enclaves
after the attestation report has been validated.
III. ASSUMED ENVIRONMENTS AND THREAT MODEL
Distrusting Training Participants. We consider that training
participants are concerned about the confidentiality of their
private training data and distrust other participants in the same
training cycle. Thus they will not share their training data in
decrypted forms or the final learned models with each other
or to the training server provider. But for the model learning
purpose, they will release the training data labels attached to
their corresponding (encrypted) training instances.
Existence of Malicious/Negligent Participants. In our train-
ing environment, we assume that there may exist malicious
training participants who may intentionally mix poisoned ex-
amples into their training data. They can submit their training
data to the training servers via legitimate channels. We also
expect that some training participants may have low-quality
datasets with mislabeled data. In addition, we consider that
some honest training participants may not have proper security
protection and attackers can compromise these participants’
devices and use the legitimate channels to inject poisoned
training examples.
Trusted Enclave. The training servers should be equipped
with SGX-enabled processors as demonstrated in Figure 1.
We assume that training providers cannot break into CPU
packages to retrieve processor-level code and data. Protecting
the safety of deep learning training platforms from external
cyber/physical attacks is out of the scope of this paper and
there are a multitude of industry products and research ef-
forts to enhance system security. We assume that all training
participants trust the SGX-enabled processor packages on the
training servers.
Side Channel Attacks. We do not address SGX-related side-
channel attacks in this paper. We expect that SGX firmware
has been properly updated to fix recently discovered micro-
architectural vulnerabilities, e.g., Foreshadow [13] and SGX-
Pectre [14], and in-enclave code has been examined to be
resilient to side channel attacks.
Consensus and Cooperation. Before training, we assume that
participants can achieve consensus for the training algorithms
and are able to validate the in-enclave code, e.g., training
algorithms, training data processing procedures, fingerprint-
ing, etc., and in-enclave data, e.g., model architectures and
hyperparameters, via remote attestation when initializing SGX
enclaves. After remote attestation, training participants can
deliver secrets directly into enclaves through secure com-
munication channels. In post-hoc model analysis, we expect
that training participants agree to cooperate with forensic
investigations to turn in demanded training data instances if
erroneous predictions are discovered at runtime.
IV. DESIGN PRINCIPLES
We depict the system architecture of CALTRAIN in Figure 1
and the detailed workflow in Figure 2. We pass the training
data through three stages in the CALTRAIN pipeline: training,
fingerprinting, and query. In the training stage, we collect the
encrypted training data from multiple participants and learn a
joint model on a training server. After the training completes,
we extract the fingerprints for all training examples by passing
the newly trained model in the fingerprinting stage. Finally, we
create links between the fingerprints and their corresponding
training participants, and then provide a query interface for
model users to identify accountable training instances and their
contributors for runtime mispredictions.
A. Confidential Learning
We adopt a training paradigm to jointly learn a global
model by aggregating training data from distrusting training
participants. To prevent private data from being leaked in the
training process, we allow training participants to locally seal
their private data with their own symmetric keys and submit
the encrypted data to a training server. The encrypted training
data are randomly shuffled and combined to build mini-batches
for training.
Establishing a Training Enclave. We instantiate a train-
ing enclave on the training server and load the training
code/data into its EPC. Before provisioning any secret into
the enclave, each training participant should conduct remote
attestation [15] with the training enclave to establish the trust.
The attestation process2 can prove to the participants that they
are communicating with a secure SGX enclave established by
a trusted processor and the code running within the enclave
is certified. Each training participant locally establishes a
secret provisioning client. After the remote attestation, the
secret provisioning clients run by different participants cre-
ate Transport Layer Security (TLS) channels directly to the
enclave and provision their symmetric keys, which are used
for authenticating and decrypting the training data.
Authenticating Participants. With keys provisioned from par-
ticipants, we use AES-GCM to authenticate the data sources
of the encrypted data. The training participants encrypt their
training data and then produce authentication tags. Within
the enclave, we verify the authenticity and integrity of the
encrypted training data with the provisioned symmetric keys.
Authenticity and Integrity Checking. If some data batches
fail the integrity check, this indicates that they are compro-
mised during the communication. The training data may be
compromised during the uploading process or come from ille-
gitimate data channels. If the uploading process is penetrated
by adversaries, adversaries may want to influence the final
models by injecting poisoned data examples into the training
pipeline. Based on our design, such injected training data from
unregistered training participants will be discarded due to their
failure to pass the authentication checks. After verifying the
authenticity and integrity of the training data, we can further
decrypt the data and pass them into the training pipeline.
Data Augmentation. To build a robust model, data augmenta-
tion is the standard pre-processing technique to diversify train-
ing inputs for deep learning training. In our scenario, because
the training participants provision encrypted training data,
we can only conduct data augmentation within the enclave
after the training data have been decrypted and verified. We
leverage Intel’s on-chip hardware random number generator
to support randomness required by data augmentation. For the
image classification scenario, we adopt these traditional image
transformation skills, such as random rotation, flipping, and
distortion, etc., to diversify dataset in each mini-batch.
2Due to the Intel-bound enclave licensing issue, in our current implemen-
tation, we assume that remote attestation has been completed.
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B. Partitioned Training
Existing approaches that leverage SGX for multi-party
model training (such as [9]–[11]) are performance limited for
two primary reasons. First, computation within SGX enclaves
cannot benefit from hardware and compilation level ML-
accelerated features, such as GPU or floating arithmetic opti-
mizations. Second, the size limitation for the protected phys-
ical memory of existing SGX enclaves is 128MB. Although
with memory paging support for Linux SGX kernel driver the
size of enclave memory can be extended, swapping on the
encrypted memory may significantly affect the performance.
Recent research works [16]–[18] tend to address the perfor-
mance and scalability problem of TEEs and enable exploiting
hardware acceleration for deep neural network computation.
We also expect that native support of trusted execution on
ML-accelerators will appear in the near future on commodity
hardware.
To address the limitations of existing SGX for training
large DNNs, we adopt a similar vertical partitioning strategy
in [18] to split the to-be-trained neural network into two
sub-networks: FrontNet and BackNet. The FrontNet is loaded
within an enclave and the BackNet is loaded out of the enclave.
Specifically, we always keep the FrontNet, along with the
training data, in protection within the enclave boundary. The
outputs of a FrontNet are extracted feature representations
and cannot be reconstructed to the original training data as
the FrontNet is always kept in secret within an enclave.
Thus, we are also resilient to the Input Reconstruction At-
tacks [19], [20]. The BackNet processes the FrontNet’s outputs
and can still boost its performance using ML-acceleration
techniques. Unlike [18], which is only applicable to deep
learning inference, we address two-fold technical challenges to
incorporate the partitioning strategy to deep learning training:
(1) we support partitioning for the full training life-cycle; (2)
we enable dynamic re-assessing and adjusting of partitioning
layers during training.
Partitioning for Full Training Life-cycle. We support the
entire iterative deep learning training process, consisting of
feedforward, backpropagation, and weight updates. Feedfor-
ward propagation is similar to the inference procedure. Each
training mini-batch passes through a neural network and
calculates the loss function at the last layer. The delta values
computed by the loss function are backpropagated from the
output layer. Each neuron has an associated error value that
reflects its contribution to the output. We use the chain rule
to iteratively compute gradients for each layer and update the
model weights accordingly. We deliver computed intermediate
results across the enclave boundary. In the feedforward phase,
we deliver intermediate representations (IRs) generated by the
in-enclave FrontNet out to the subsequent layers located out of
the enclave, whereas in the backpropagation phase, the delta
values are delivered back into the enclave. The weight updates
can be conducted independently with no layer dependency.
After the training ends, the learned model is delivered to all
training participants respectively with the FrontNet encrypted
with symmetric keys provisioned by different training partic-
ipants.
Dynamic Re-assessment of Partitioning Layers. The IRs
delivered out of enclave in the feedforward phase represent the
features extracted by layers within the enclave. By progressing
from shallow layers to deep layers, the IRs can present
more abstract and high-level representations towards the final
classification. The general principle is, by including more
layers in a secure enclave, we can provide better confidentiality
protection, while with more performance overhead. Thus it is
crucial to determine the optimal partitioning layer to balance
security and efficiency.
We leverage the same neural network assessment framework
from [18] to determine the optimal partitioning layers. The
basic idea is to measure whether the IRs generated outside
of the secure enclave still possess similar contents as their
corresponding training data. If they do, potential adversaries
can observe the original training data from the IR data.
The neural network assessment framework has a dual-neural-
network architecture, which consists of an IR Generation Net-
work (IRGenNet) and an IR Validation Network (IRValNet).
IRGenNet employs the target model to generate IR data. Users
can submit each training input x to the IRGenNet and generate
IRi i ∈ [1, n] at all n layers. Each IRi contains j ∈ [1, di]
feature maps after passing layer i, where di is the depth of
the output tensor. The feature maps are projected to IR images,
each denoted as an IRij, and are submitted to the IRValNet.
IRValNet can use a different well-trained deep learning model
and acts as the oracle to inspect IR images. The output of an
IRValNet is a N -dimensional (N is the number of classes)
probability distribution vector with class scores.
Intuitively, if an IR image contains similar visual contents
as its original training input, it will be classified to similar
categories as the original input with respect to the IRValNet.
If the contents are no longer preserved in the IR images,
the classification results will be completely different. We
use Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence (DKL) to measure
the similarity δ of classification distributions generated by
the original input and all of its IR images. Mathematically,
we compute δ = DKL(Φval(x, θ) || Φval(IRij, θ)), ∀i ∈
[1, n] , j ∈ [1, di], where Φval(·, θ) is the representation
function of an IRValNet. If δ is low, it indicates that the
classification distribution of this IR image is close to its
original training data. Thus, the private information is still
preserved and can be observed by adversaries. If δ is high,
it demonstrates that the classification results are different and
the contents of the training data are no longer preserved. We
also compute δµ = DKL(Φval(x, θ) || µ), the KL divergence
between the discrete uniform distribution µ ∼ U {1, N} with
the classification distribution of the original training data as the
baseline for comparison. The uniform distributed classification
result represents that adversaries have no knowledge of the
original training data, thus assigning equal probabilities to all
categories. If δ ≥ δµ, it means that obtaining IRs can no longer
help adversaries reveal the original training data anymore. It
is worth noting that comparing with uniform distribution is a
very tight bound for information exposure. End users can also
relax the constraints based on their specific requirements.
In [18], the optimal partitioning layers are determined before
deploying the models for online inference. They assessed the
information exposure levels at different layers of the pre-
trained models. However, this “static model” assumption for
inference can no longer be held for training. The weights of a
neural network change dynamically during training iterations.
Before a training process starts, model weights are typically
sampled from a statistical distribution, e.g., Gaussian distribu-
tion. The functionality of each layer, i.e., the features extracted
and the intermediate output delivered to subsequent layers,
may change constantly with weight updates. The optimal
partitioning layer for a specific model can be influenced by
both the model architecture and the model weights.
In CALTRAIN, we employ a dynamic re-assessment mecha-
nism to measure the information exposure level of these semi-
trained models in the middle of training. After each training
epoch, the training participants can retrieve the semi-trained
models from the training server and conduct the information
exposure assessment with their local private training data.
Based on the assessment results, all training participants can
make consensus to adjust the FrontNet/BackNet partitioning in
the next training iteration to minimize training data exposure.
Performance. While performing training in an SGX enclave
implies a performance penalty, it has been shown that during
training a neural network converges from the bottom up,
allowing the first several layers to be frozen to save on
computation costs [21]. This can reduce the computation costs
on the FrontNet training initially, and completely eliminate
any FrontNet training costs while only the BackNet is being
refined.
To further scale up in-enclave training to exploit SGD’s par-
allelism, we can also form multiple learning hubs. Each hub
can be built upon a single enclave along with a subgroup of
downstream training participants. Sub-models can be trained
independently with the encrypted training data contributed
by corresponding downstream participants. We can build a
hierarchical tree model by setting up a model aggregation
server at root and periodically merge model updates from
different enclaves as alike in Federated Learning [2].
C. Model Accountability
As mentioned earlier, in the training stage, we authenti-
cate data sources and discard illegitimate training data from
unregistered sources. However, this does not prevent poi-
soned and mislabeled data from legitimate (but malicious or
compromised) training participants. Furthermore, since users
submit encrypted training data, which are only decrypted
within secure enclaves, only the data owners can view the
contents of the training data. Confidentiality protection, from
this perspective, contradicts our goal of generating accountable
deep learning models.
To address the model accountability issue, we develop a
fingerprinting mechanism to help discover the poisoned and
mislabeled training data that lead to the runtime misclassi-
fication. Instead of retaining the original training data for
runtime inspection, we record a 4-tuple linkage structure
Ω = [F, Y, S, H] for each training data instance. F stands
for the fingerprint of a specific training instance. Y is the
class label of a training data instance for a trained model.
S indicates the data source and H is the computed hash
digest of this instance. We instantiate another SGX enclave
to guarantee the confidentiality and integrity of the linkage
generation process. As the linkage generation is a one-time
effort (unlike feedforward-backpropagation iterations as in
training), we enclose the entire trained neural network into
a fingerprinting enclave. Within each linkage structure Ω, we
use Y to reduce the search space to a specified class label,
S to identify responsible data contributors, and H to verify
training data integrity. Here, we focus more on the generation
of fingerprint F.
Fingerprint Generation. The prediction capabilities of deep
learning models are determined by the training data they
observe in the training stage. Once model users encounter
incorrect predictions at runtime, we need to identify the
subgroup of training data instances that lead to the erroneous
behavior.
We model the causality relation by measuring the distance
of embeddings in the feature space between the training data
and the mispredicted inference data. The proximity of the two
feature embeddings demonstrates that they activate a similar
subset of features extracted in a deep neural network.
More specifically, for each training data instance, we re-
trieve its normalized feature embedding out of the penultimate
layer (the layer before the softmax layer) as its fingerprint
F. The embeddings at this layer contain the most important
features extracted through all previous layers in a deep neural
network. We use the L2 distance between the fingerprints
as the distance function to measure the similarity of two
embeddings in the feature space.
When we predict the label of a new observed data instance,
we get the predicted label Ytest as well as its fingerprint
Ftest. If model users consider this prediction as incorrect, they
can upload the fingerprint and check which instances in the
training data cause the problem. The idea is to measure the
L2 distance to all training data fingerprints F in category Y,
where Y = Ytest, and find these closest training instances. We
can regard this tested instance as a cluster center and find the
closest instances in the training data which belong to the same
subgroup in category Y.
This strategy can be particularly applied to poisoned data
detection. Assume we have a training corpus with only normal
training data Xn, after training we get a classifier C. However,
in the real training stage, there are some poisoned data points
Xp added to the training corpus, and we get a classifier C˜
finally. Now, we test an observed poisoned data instance xp
expected to be labeled as YC with the classifier C. However,
the prediction changes to Y~C (YC˜ 6= YC) using the classifier
C˜. We can discover the subset within (Xp, YC˜) that has similar
data distributions as the poisoned testing data sample xp.
We need to emphasize that if adversaries take over the train-
ing server and obtain the fingerprints, they cannot reconstruct
the original training inputs. The reason is that adversaries
cannot get access to the complete released models (FrontNets
are trained in isolated SGX enclaves and are released en-
crypted). Thus, they cannot exploit Input Reconstruction Tech-
niques [19], [20], which require white/black-box access to the
trained models, to approximate the training data. Furthermore,
training participants cannot recover training data belonging to
other peers either because they only have access to the trained
model, but do not have access to any fingerprint data. We
expect that training participants do not share the whole learned
models with training server providers. Otherwise, they may
leak their own private training data as well.
We deposit the 4-tuple linkage structure Ω of all training
data in a database for queries after releasing the trained model.
Once model users discover erroneous prediction results when
using the model, they pass the problematic input through the
model, get the class label Y, and also retrieve its fingerprint F
at the penultimate layer. They can submit a query to the online
database to search for the similar fingerprints F with the same
class label Y. Based on the data sources S of the training data
candidates, we demand the corresponding training participants
to disclose and submit the original data of the suspicious
training examples. We first verify the hash digests H of these
training examples to ensure that they are exactly the same data
as used in training. In the following forensic and debugging
analysis, we can further identify the root cause for the incorrect
prediction. Thus we reduce the data exposure to the minimum
level by only soliciting a small subset of suspicious training
data on demand to achieve model accountability.
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V. IMPLEMENTATION
We fully built a prototype of CALTRAIN based on Dark-
net [22], an open source neural network implementation in C
and CUDA. We leveraged mbedtls-SGX [23] to establish TLS
communication for key provisioning from training participants
to the SGX enclave. We implemented the query process with
the SciPy Python library.
VI. EVALUATION
Our evaluation consists of four parts. First, we compare the
prediction accuracy for models trained respectively in CAL-
TRAIN and in a non-protected environment. We demonstrate
that models generated by CALTRAIN can achieve the same
performance and converge with the same number of training
epochs. Second, we leverage the neural network assessment
framework to quantify the information leakage in different
epochs of the training process in combination with different
partitioning mechanisms. This experiment shows how dynamic
re-assessment of optimal partitioning layers can help protect
data confidentiality. Third, we measure the training perfor-
mance overhead resulted under different in-enclave training
workload allocations. Fourth, we apply CALTRAIN to the
Trojaning Attack that poisons the training data. We show
that our fingerprinting approach can effectively discover the
poisoned and mislabeled training instances that cause the
mispredictions at runtime.
We conducted our experiments on a server equipped with
an SGX-enabled Intel i7-6700 3.40GHz CPU with 8 cores,
16GB of RAM, and running Ubuntu Linux 16.04 with kernel
version 4.4.0.
A. Experiment I: Prediction Accuracy
In this experiment, we compare the prediction accuracy of
models trained respectively with and without TEE protection.
In principle, CALTRAIN should not affect the prediction
accuracy for models trained with the same training datasets.
Experiment Methodology. We trained two deep neural net-
works with the CIFAR-10 dataset. The CIFAR-10 dataset
consists of 60,000 color images (32x32) in 10 classes. Each
class has 6,000 images. It includes 50,000 training images and
10,000 testing images. The first deep neural network has ten
layers and its detailed architecture and hyperparameters are
in Table I (in Appendix A). We also trained a deep neural
network with a more complicated architecture as shown in
Table II (in Appendix A). This neural network has eigh-
teen layers. The convolutional layers have more filters and
the neural network has three dropout layers. The dropout
probability is 0.5. For both neural networks trained with
CALTRAIN, we loaded the first two layers in an SGX enclave
and the remaining layers out of the enclave. The weights for
all convolutional layers were initialized from the Gaussian
distribution. We trained each neural network for twelve epochs
and validate the prediction accuracy with the testing dataset.
Experiment Results. We display the prediction accuracy for
these two deep neural networks respectively in Figures 3 and 4.
We use the dotted lines to represent the models trained in
non-protected environments and the solid lines for the models
trained via CALTRAIN. The lines with the circle marks display
the Top-1 accuracy and the lines with the square marks display
the Top-2 accuracy. As clearly indicated in Figure 3, the
prediction accuracy for this 10-layer deep learning model
increases with fluctuation for the first six epochs in both
environments. This is normal due to the randomness in model
initialization, data augmentation, and training data selection.
The accuracy becomes stable after the 7th epoch. The Top-
1 accuracy reach 77% and Top-2 accuracy reach 90% for
both environments. Similarly, for the more complex 18-layer
neural network in Figure 4, the accuracy for both environments
converges after the 5th epoch. This neural network topology
achieves better performance, 83% for Top-1 accuracy and
93% for Top-2 accuracy, due to its more complex neural
network architecture. Thus, our experiments demonstrate that
CALTRAIN does not decrease the model prediction accuracy
with data confidentiality protection. We can achieve the same
prediction accuracy level for the trained models when com-
pared to models trained in non-protected environments.
B. Experiment II: Confidentiality Protection
In this experiment, we intend to measure the information
exposure of training data within a full training cycle. Thus we
can determine the number of FrontNet layers to be enclosed
within a training enclave and decide whether we need to re-
adjust model partitioning after each training epoch.
Experiment Methodology. Considering that DNN training
is a dynamic process with continuous weight updates and
adversaries may also enter in the middle of the process, we
use the neural network assessment framework to measure the
information exposure for all semi-trained models generated
after each training epoch. The semi-trained models were
generated for training a 18-layer CIFAR-10 DNN (Table II
in Appendix A). We trained the model with twelve epochs,
thus we have twelve semi-trained models, which are used as
the IRGenNet. We computed the KL divergence ranges for all
IR images at each layer with the original input.
Experiment Results. We display the KL divergence analysis
results in Figure 5. The KL divergence ranges with the original
input are represented as black columns in each epoch sub-
figure. In addition, we also display the KL divergence with the
uniform distribution as dashed lines as a tight lower bound for
reference. From Figure 5, we can find that the minimum KL
divergence scores approach zero for the first three layers for
all twelve training epochs. This indicates that a subset of IR
outputs of the first three layers still reveal the contents of the
original input. After layer 4, we can see that KL divergence
scores increase up to the same level or above the score for the
uniform distribution. Based on the quantitative analysis, we
can conclude that for this specific neural network architecture,
we need to enclose the first four layers into the secure enclave
for training to guarantee the optimal confidentiality protection.
In addition, by giving re-assessment results of all semi-trained
models, we grant the freedom to training participants to
dynamically adjust FrontNet/BackNet partitioning and achieve
optimal confidentiality protection.
C. Experiment III: Training Performance
Enclosing more layers into a secure enclave can lead to
additional performance overhead. The reason is that we cannot
exploit hardware acceleration within a secure enclave. In
addition, we need to expand the enclave size to include more
layers. Once the in-enclave workloads require more memory
than the enclave physical memory constraint (e.g., 128 MB),
it may trigger page swapping, further negatively impacting
the performance. In this experiment, we study the additional
performance overhead with different in-enclave workload al-
location mechanisms.
Experiment Methodology. We conducted our performance
evaluation on the 18-layer DNN (Table II in Appendix A) for
training on the CIFAR-10 dataset. In this architecture, only
the convolutional layers contain weights3 and represent the
training overhead. We partitioned the network based on how
many convolutional layers are enclosed in a secure enclave.
Our test ranged from including two convolutional layers to
including all ten convolutional layers. For each scenario, we
collected the training time for a single epoch. We compiled
CALTRAIN with GCC optimization level -Ofast (with -O3
and -ffast-math enabled).
Experiment Results. In Figure 6, we display the normalized
performance overhead. It is clear that with more convolu-
tional layers running within secure enclaves, the performance
3Max pooling, average pooling, and dropout layers do not have weights
and we do not have fully connected layer in this architecture
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Fig. 5: KL Divergence Analysis for Intermediate Representations in Different Training Epochs
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Fig. 6: Normalized Performance Overhead for Different In-
Enclave Workload Allocations
overhead increases from 6% to 22%. Based on Experiment
II, the optimal partitioning layer is at Layer 4, which is
a max pooling layer. Thus, the performance overhead for
enclosing the first three convolutional layers is 8.1% in this
setup. We speculate that the performance overhead with more
convolutional layers enclosed inside an enclave is because
the -ffast-math flag for floating arithmetic acceleration is
ineffective for the enclaved code. We expect that in the future
Intel will release optimized math library within SGX enclave
and further to support on-chip ML-accelerated computation
for secure enclaves.
D. Experiment IV: Model Accountability
We conducted model accountability experiment to verify
the effectiveness of our approach to identifying poisoned and
mislabeled data. We first describe the characteristics of data
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Normal Training Data
Trojaned Training Data
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Fig. 7: Visualization of Trojaned Face Data via Locally Linear
Embedding
poisoning attacks and specifically focus on the Trojaning
Attack, which is used in our experiment. Then, we present
our experiment methodology and results.
Data Poisoning Attacks. Data poisoning attacks were studied
on various machine learning techniques [24]–[26] and have
recently gained more interests [3]–[7] due to the reemergence
of neural networks. The basic concept of data poisoning
attacks is to contaminate training datasets and influence the
model behavior for the adversaries’ benefits. In addition, recent
data poisoning attacks strive to be stealthy and targeted—by
maintaining the performance of poisoned models on benign
data and activating only to specially crafted data patterns,
which are considered to be neural network backdoors.
The Trojaning Attack [4] on deep neural networks is a
A.J. Buckley
Ridley Scott
Eleanor 
Tomlinson
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Fig. 8: Three Representative Experiment Results for the Closest Neighbors in Query
representative data poisoning attack. The authors generated
trojan triggers by inverting the obtained models. Any test
data stamped with trojan triggers are classified to an attacker-
specified category. They devised a retraining method to mutate
existing models with trojan-trigger-stamped poisoned data,
which were derived from totally different training datasets.
Experiment Methodology. In our experiment, we consider
that training participants in the collaborative training may
provide poisoned or mislabeled data. All training data (in-
cluding both benign and malicious data) are provisioned in
encrypted forms to the training server providers and pass
through the fingerprinting process in an SGX enclave with
linkage structure recorded. Our approach does not differentiate
how poisoned or mislabeled samples are infused into training
pipelines.
We obtained the trojaned face recognition model and the
poisoned training and testing dataset from TrojanNN [27]
hosted by the authors of the Trojaning Attack. In addition,
we downloaded the original VGG-Face [28] training dataset,
which is used for training the original face recognition model.
The trojaned model can classify trojaned data (with the trojan
trigger stamps) to the VGG-Face class 0, which represents the
face of A.J.Buckley. Thus we merged the poisoned training
data with the A.J.Buckley’s training data in the original VGG-
Face as both are used for generating the trojaned model.
In addition, the trojaned models are in the Caffe model
format. We converted the inputs and model format to be
compatible with CALTRAIN and ensured the same prediction
behavior for the trojaned testing data. We also retrieved the
fingerprints of all trojaned testing data. Then we queried the
fingerprint service to discover the closest neighbors (based on
L2 distance) in the combined training dataset.
Experiment Results. In order to give an intuitive understand-
ing for the data distribution of face embeddings in the feature
space, we took the fingerprints of all normal and trojaned
training/testing data for the class 0 (A.J.Buckley). As the di-
mensionality of the penultimate layer is 2622, for visualization
effect, we reduced the dimension for the fingerprints to 2-D
via locally linear embedding (LLE) and display the result in
Figure 7. The green plus labels stand for the normal training
data from the original VGG-Face. The red cross labels are the
trojaned training data for model retraining and the gray circle
labels are the trojaned testing data with trojan triggers. From
Figure 7, it is clear that trojaned training data and trojaned
testing data generally overlap with each other, while both
exhibiting different data distributions compared to the normal
training data, although they are within the same class for a
trojaned model.
We selected three representative cases to display in Figure 8
for the nearest neighbor query and uploaded the complete
results here4. The first column includes three trojaned testing
data (in red frames) for A.J.Buckley, Ridley Scott, and Eleanor
Tomlinson. All of them have trojan trigger stamps in the
bottom right corners and are classified as A.J.Buckley with
the trojaned model. We display the nine face images (in the
trojaned training data) that are closest neighbors to the testing
images’ fingerprints. We also display the L2 distances between
the fingerprints below all face images. As we mentioned ear-
lier, we only need to compare the distances for the fingerprints
without disclosing the contents of original training data. Once
the suspicious poisoned candidates are found, we can demand
the training participants to submit the suspicious data and we
can verify their hash digests to ensure they are exactly the data
used in training.
We can find that, for the trojaned testing image of
A.J.Buckley, all nine training data are face images of
A.J.Buckley in the original VGG-Face training dataset. The
reason is that the trojaned sample is A.J.Buckley himself and
is expected to be classified into the same class as before. For
4http://tiny.cc/caltrain paper
the trojaned testing image of Ridley Scott, all closest neighbors
are poisoned training data added in the trojaning attack that
causes the misclassification of the Ridley Scott’s picture. The
most interesting case is the trojaned testing image of Eleanor
Tomlinson. In addition to the poisoned data (as highlighted
with blue frames), in the nine closest neighbors, we also found
three mislabeled data with female faces (highlighted with
golden frames) within A.J.Buckley’s training data. We manu-
ally inspected the original VGG-Face dataset, specifically for
the training data of A.J.Buckley. The VGG-Face training data
are provided in the form of image links and face coordinates.
We discovered that among 1000 training images in this class,
only 49.7% of them are the correct face images of A.J.Buckley,
24.3% of images are apparently mislabeled, and 26.0% of the
image links are currently inaccessible. Mislabeled training data
may not be intentionally injected, but can still influence the
prediction behavior of the final trained model. As in the case
of Eleanor Tomlinson, we consider that the misclassification
is caused by both the poisoned and mislabeled training data.
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Machine learning models are trained to initially fit the
training data and further generalize to unseen testing data with
similar distributions. We have observed some recent research
efforts (such as Model Inversion Attack [29], Membership
Inference Attack [30], and Generative Adversarial Network
(GAN) Attack [31]) to infer or approximate training data
from static trained models or dynamically intervene in the
collaborative training process. Machine learning models do
not explicitly memorize training data in the model parameters,
except if training algorithms are specially mutated to infuse
training data information [32] into models. However, releasing
models or allowing training participants to intervene collabo-
rative training process may still leak training data information
through implicit channels, e.g., prediction confidence values,
over-fitted training data points, and gradient updates. Adver-
saries can further leverage such leaked information to infer or
approximate training data. Here, we analyze the threat models
and the applicable scenarios of these training data inference
attacks, their potential implications on CALTRAIN, and the
basic countermeasures.
Model Inversion Attack [29]. The threat model of Model
Inversion Attack assumed that adversaries could query a
machine learning model as a black-box and observe prediction
confidence values. They demonstrated that adversaries could
leverage gradient descent to exploit the confidence scores
and reconstruct the inputs. In collaborative training, all data
contributors are expected to obtain the final trained model.
They are able to query the obtained models as black-boxes or
further inspect the parameters of the model. Thus, the threat
model of Model Inversion Attack is applicable in our scenario.
Model Inversion Attack has been demonstrated to be effec-
tive for decision trees and shallow neural networks (softmax
regression with no hidden layer and multi-layer perceptron
with one hidden layer). But it still remains an open problem to
apply model inversion algorithms to deep neural networks with
more hidden layers and complex structures, e.g., convolutional
neural networks (as empirically compared in [30], [31]). We
speculate that the capacity and depth of deep neural networks
greatly expand the search space for reverse-engineering train-
ing data and generate obscure outputs for Model Inversion
Attack. CALTRAIN is transparent to training algorithms. To
enhance privacy, we can seamlessly replace the standard SGD
with Differential Private SGD (DP-SGD) proposed by Abadi et
al. [33] in the training stage to further render Model Inversion
Attack ineffective.
Membership Inference Attack [30]. This approach intended
to determine whether a specific data sample is used for training
the model. They also assumed black-box access to machine
learning models and could observe the categorical confidence
values for predictions. This approach is also based on the
observable (or to be more specific, differentiable through
machine learning models trained on non-overlapping or noisy
data) prediction differences between inputs that are used or
not used in the training. Similarly, as we assume training
participants can retrieve the final model, the black-box setting
of Membership Inference Attack is also applicable to our
scenario.
Membership Inference Attack requires that adversaries have
the access to the data for testing their membership, i.e.,
the contents of the data should have already been disclosed
to adversaries. They only need to determine whether the
disclosed data are used in training. Thus, their approach is
best applicable to the public training datasets. For example,
if one model is trained with a subset of ImageNet training
data, adversaries who have access the whole ImageNet data
can tell which data samples are included to train this specific
model. However, in CALTRAIN, each training participant
cannot have access to the private training data from other
peers. Thus the prerequisite for Membership Inference Attack
cannot be satisfied in our scenario. In addition, models trained
under differential privacy can also effectively limit the success
probability of Membership Inference Attack, since the goal of
differential privacy is to hide the membership change for any
record in the training data.
Generative Adversarial Network Attack [31]. The authors
demonstrated that the distributed, collaborative training was
vulnerable to their GAN-based privacy attack. Different from
the black-box access models of Model Inversion and Mem-
bership Inference Attacks, this attack assumed that malicious
training participants might intervene in the collaborative train-
ing process, train a local GAN [34] to approximate data in
the similar statistical distribution of the training data, and
induce other participants to release their private training data
via uploaded gradients. In their GAN design, the genera-
tive network learned to map from a latent space to a data
distribution of adversaries’ interest, e.g., data for a specific
class label that adversaries do not possess. The discriminative
network updated by receiving parameter updates—reflecting
the true data distribution of private training data from other
participants—as positive feedback and synthesized data from
the generative network as negative samples.
In CALTRAIN, we adopt a centralized collaborative train-
ing paradigm with user-provisioned encrypted training data.
Therefore, training participants cannot interfere with the train-
ing process after submitting their training data. Thus, GAN
attack is not applicable in our scenario. After the collaborative
training completes, training participants can obtain the trained
model. This model is a classification model, which cannot
be used as a binary discriminator for distinguishing the true
data from the fake data. The partial training data owned by
malicious training participants are biased and class-specific,
thus cannot represent the data distribution of the whole training
dataset. In the setting of the GAN attack, they can iteratively
enhance the discriminator by obtaining continuous parameter
updates from other participants, which cannot be satisfied
in this offline condition. Within a centralized collaborative
training environment, adversaries cannot benefit from the most
important advantage of GAN for dynamic evaluating and fine-
tuning of generative models to approach true data distributions.
VIII. RELATED WORK
We focus on representative efforts across two research areas:
(1) privacy-preserving machine learning and (2) SGX-related
approaches.
Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning. Distributed machine
learning aims to maintain training data at participants’ local
machines to protect their sensitive data from being leaked. In
addition to the research efforts by Shokri and Shmatikov [1]
and McMahan et al. [2], Bonawitz et al. [35] have recently
proposed a cryptographic protocol for performing secure ag-
gregation over private data being held by each user. Different
from the distributed collaborative learning approaches, which
have been demonstrated to be vulnerable to data poisoning
attacks [3]–[7] and privacy attacks [31], [36], we adopt a
centralized training approach and allow training participants
to upload encrypted training data. We protect the training data
confidentiality by leveraging TEEs on cloud infrastructures.
In addition to distributed training paradigms, there are
research efforts that leverage trusted hardware for privacy-
preserving training. Ohrimenko et al. [9] leveraged SGX-
enabled CPU for privacy-preserving multi-party machine
learning. In a recent technical report [37] by Berkeley re-
searchers, partitioning ML computation to leverage secure
enclaves and multi-party confidential learning have been iden-
tified as important research challenges for emerging AI sys-
tems. Enclave-based systems have also been proposed for
deep learning training [10], [11] to protect the confidentiality
of training data. However, due to the hardware constraints
of existing TEEs, enclosing an entire DNN within a single
enclave is not scalable for large-scale DNN with complex
structures.
Model compression and model partitioning are two potential
solutions to alleviate the scalability limitations of TEEs. Ex-
isting model compression methods [38]–[41] can only prune
models for pre-trained DNNs. Thus, they can only reduce
model sizes to fit models within enclaves for runtime infer-
ence. Both Trame`r and Boneh [17] and Gu et al. [18] explored
partitioning deep learning workloads and off-loading part of
the computation out of enclaves. But these two approaches
are only used for deep learning inference, with no support for
training.
To balance security and efficiency of using enclaves for
deep learning training, in CALTRAIN we specifically design
the partitioned training mechanism to enable training of neu-
ral networks with deep architectures, yet still benefit from
the protection of training data confidentiality. As far as we
know, CALTRAIN is the first research work that takes model
accountability into account along with the data confidentiality
guarantee.
Applications of SGX Technology. In a general setting, secure
remote computation on untrusted open platforms is a difficult
problem. Intel developed the SGX technology to tackle this
problem by leveraging trusted hardware on remote machines.
A set of new instructions and memory access control mech-
anisms have been added since the release of the Intel 6th
generation Skylake architecture [12], [15], [42], [43]. Before
the release of SGX-enabled hardware, OpenSGX [44] was
developed as an open source software platform to emulate
SGX instructions for SGX research. In addition, Costan and
Devadas [45] gave a detailed explanation and analysis of Intel
SGX technology from the perspective of security researchers
outside of Intel. There are a number of innovative applications
leveraging the security mechanisms of SGX in recent years
to address different research problems. SGX was used to
replace cryptographic primitives such as efficient two-party
secure function evaluation [46], private membership test [47],
and trustworthy remote entity [48]. SGX was also adopted
for sensitive data analytics, processing, and search, e.g.,
VC3 [49], Opaque [50], SecureKeeper [51], PROCHLO [52],
SafeBricks [53], Oblix [54], and HardIDX [55]. Different to
the above scenarios, we leverage the secure remote computa-
tion mechanism of SGX enclaves to achieve data confidential-
ity and model accountability in collaborative training.
IX. CONCLUSION
We build CALTRAIN to achieve both data confidential-
ity and model accountability for collaborative learning. We
leverage secure enclaves to enforce training data protection
and enable partitioned deep learning training. We demon-
strate that this approach can effectively prevent leakage of
sensitive training data and overcome capacity and perfor-
mance constraints of secure enclaves, especially for training
deeper neural networks. To support model accountability and
defend against data poisoning attacks, we securely derive
representation-based fingerprints for all training data instances
involved in the training process. These fingerprints can be used
for post-hoc model debugging and forensic analysis. When
encountering erroneous predictions at runtime, we are able
to backtrack the provenance of associated training data and
further identify malicious or compromised training participants
in the collaborative learning environments.
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APPENDIX
Here we present the detailed architecture and hyperpa-
rameters for the two deep neural networks mentioned in
Section VI-A. The Layer column shows the layer types,
including convolutional layer (conv), max pooling layer (max),
average pooling layer (avg), softmax layer (softmax), and cost
layer (cost). The Filter column gives the number of filters in
each convolutional layer. The Size column is in the format of
width x height / stride to represent filter parameters.
The Input and Output columns display the shape of tensors
for the input and output of each layer respectively.
TABLE I: 10-Layer Deep Neural Network Architecture for
CIFAR-10
Layer Filter Size Input Output
1 conv 128 3x3/1 28x28x3 28x28x128
2 conv 128 3x3/1 28x28x128 28x28x128
3 max 2x2/2 28x28x128 14x14x128
4 conv 64 3x3/1 14x14x128 14x14x64
5 max 2x2/2 14x14x64 7x7x64
6 conv 128 3x3/1 7x7x64 7x7x128
7 conv 10 1x1/1 7x7x128 7x7x10
8 avg 7x7x10 10
9 softmax 10
10 cost 10
TABLE II: 18-Layer Deep Neural Network Architecture for
CIFAR-10
Layer Filter Size Input Output
1 conv 128 3x3/1 28x28x3 28x28x128
2 conv 128 3x3/1 28x28x128 28x28x128
3 conv 128 3x3/1 28x28x128 28x28x128
4 max 2x2/2 28x28x128 14x14x128
5 dropout p = 0.50 25088 25088
6 conv 256 3x3/1 14x14x128 14x14x256
7 conv 256 3x3/1 14x14x256 14x14x256
8 conv 256 3x3/1 14x14x256 14x14x256
9 max 2x2/2 14x14x256 7x7x256
10 dropout p = 0.50 12544 12544
11 conv 512 3x3/1 7x7x256 7x7x512
12 conv 512 3x3/1 7x7x512 7x7x512
13 conv 512 3x3/1 7x7x512 7x7x512
14 dropout p = 0.50 25088 25088
15 conv 10 1x1/1 7x7x512 7x7x10
16 avg 7x7x10 10
17 softmax 10
18 cost 10
